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Severe water ingress accidents in the 200-MW HTR-
module were assessed to determine the safety margins of
modular pebble-bed high-temperature gas-cooled reac-
tors (HTR-module). The 200-MW HTR-module was de-
signed by Siemens under the criteria that no active safety
protection systems were necessary because of its inher-
ent safe nature. For simulating the behavior of the HTR-
module during severe water ingress accidents, a water,
steam, and helium multiphase cavity model was devel-
oped and implemented in the dynamic simulator for
nuclear power plants (DSNP) simulation system. Com-
parisons of the DSNP simulations incorporating these
models with experiments and with calculations using the
time-dependent neutronics and temperature dynamics code
were made to validate the simulation. The analysis of the
primary circuit showed that the maximum water concen-
tration increase in the reactor core was ,0.3 kg/(m3s).
The water vaporization in the steam generator and char-
acteristics of water transport from the steam generator to
the reactor core would reduce the rate of water ingress
into the reactor core. The analysis of a full cavitation of
the feedwater pump showed that if the secondary circuit
could be depressurized, the feedwater pump would be
stopped by the full cavitation. This limits the water
transported from the deaerator to the steam generator.
A comprehensive simulation of the HTR-module power
plant showed that the water inventory in the primary
circuit was limited to ;3000 kg. The nuclear reactivity
increase caused by the water ingress would lead to a fast
power excursion, which would be inherently counter-
balanced by negative feedback effects. The integrity of
the fuel elements, because the safety-relevant temper-
ature limit of 16008C is not reached in any case, is not
challenged.
I. INTRODUCTION
The main safety concerns of pebble-bed high-
temperature gas-cooled reactors ~HTGRs! with steam
cycles were addressed by mitigation of three types of
design basis accidents, namely: loss of coolant accidents
~LOCAs!, severe air ingress accidents, and severe water
ingress accidents. The decay-heat removal issue after a
LOCA was resolved when the HTGR design adopted
the concept of modularization.1 In the modular HTGRs
~MHTGRs!, the decay-heat is removed completely by
means of conduction and radiation. No convection is
necessary. The air ingress accident is a relatively slow
process, although the air is able to corrode the graphite
reactor core. The corrosion of graphite in the reactor core
will not start until natural air circulation between the
environment and the reactor core is established. Thus
there is a delay of several tens of hours before corrosion
would actually take place.2
The above two types of accidents were addressed
previously. Compared to them, the water ingress acci-
dents are more complicated. The water ingress causes
two effects, namely the corrosion of the graphite reactor
core and positive reactivity insertion due to the water
ingress into a submoderated reactor core. The high pressure
difference between the secondary and primary circuits*E-mail: dongyj@tsinghua.edu.cn
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and the positive reactivity cause the accident to be rapid
and severe.
According to the analyses performed by Siemens
INTERATOM ~Refs. 3 and 4!, a one-tube double-end
break in the steam generator will cause ;600 kg water
ingress into the primary circuit even with a series of
quick actions to actuate the reactor protection systems.
Without the activation of the reactor protection systems
more water would ingress into the primary circuit. The
operations of the reactor protection systems include shut-
ting down the reactor, stopping the blower, closing the
isolating valves in the inlet and outlet of the steam gen-
erator, and emptying the steam generator. Although the
600 kg water ingress will not cause severe safety conse-
quences, the mitigation systems for water ingress acci-
dents need to be activated through valves and signals.
Thus, the philosophy of inherent safety at that point may
not seem to be fully compatible with those adopted in the
afterheat removal, which depends on inherent safety and
passive mechanisms only, not on active actions of reactor
safety systems. Therefore, a thorough study for a severe
water ingress accident was necessary.
The analysis of severe water ingress accidents is im-
portant for another fundamental reason. The worldwide
development of a safe nuclear energy has led to the de-
sign of a new generation of nuclear power plants, which
depend more on inherent and passive safety mechanisms.
These efforts have obviously improved the reactor safety
by reducing the core damage frequency. However, this
seems not enough for the public acceptance of nuclear
energy. Engineers should find a new safety philosophy to
improve the public acceptance, which to a great extent is
not a technical but a political and psychological issue.
The so-called catastrophe-free nuclear technology adopted
such philosophy.5 Catastrophe-free nuclear technology is
realized if the radioactive fission products in all possible
accidents are retained nearly totally inside the reactor
plant.5 In a so-defined catastrophe-free nuclear plant there
is no probability that to any degree the public safety is
challenged. The HTR-module was meant to implement
the catastrophe-free safety concept. It is under these prem-
ises that it is necessary to demonstrate that the reactor is
catastrophe-free during water ingress accidents.
In order to demonstrate the inherent safety of the
HTR-module under water ingress accidents, and also to
determine whether the HTR-module is catastrophe-free
during severe water ingress accidents, an assessment was
made for the extremely severe consequences of water
ingress accidents in the HTR-module by numerical sim-
ulations. All numerical analyses are performed under the
general assumptions of no active actions of the reactor
safety system, namely
1. no scram
2. no steam generator isolating
3. no steam generator emptying
4. no control on the feed water pump and the sec-
ondary circuit
5. no control on the blower.
In the water ingress accident, the positive reactivity
insertion is a short-term effect, which is mainly deter-
mined by the rate of water ingress into the reactor core.
The corrosion of the graphite reactor core is a long-term
effect, which is influenced by the water ingress mass.
The question of how fast the water could enter into the
reactor core was addressed by simulating the accidental
water transport in the primary circuit. The question of
how much water could enter into the primary circuit was
addressed by analyzing the behavior of the secondary
circuit during water ingress accidents. Sections III and
IV address these two subjects, respectively.
Besides the HTR-module,3,4 there were several other
water ingress accident analyses for the pebble-bed HTGRs.
Wawrzik established a lumped model to simulate the
water ingress accident in the AVR reactor.6 In this model,
liquid water, steam, and helium were considered. How-
ever, the lumped model used was unable to analyze the
water transport from the steam generator to the reactor
core. The REACT0THERMIX code7 could deal with the
transport of steam, helium, and other gases in the pri-
mary circuit and the chemical reactions. That code was
used to analyze the PNP-500 conceptual design.8 How-
ever, it did not consider the behavior of liquid water and
the reactor nuclear power feedback. The time-dependent
neutronics and temperatures ~TINTE! code system9 com-
bines a two-dimensional transient analysis of thermal
hydraulics and nuclear dynamics with a one-dimensional
simulation of the primary circuit. With these capabilities
and the capability of analyzing the chemical reactions of
graphite, TINTE is a more advanced analysis tool. In its
current version, TINTE does not yet consider liquid water
in the primary circuit. Until now there have been no
computer codes available that combine the secondary
circuit into a full-scale water ingress simulation. There-
fore, a simulation program was developed that combined
the models of liquid water vaporization and condensa-
tion in the primary circuit and the modeling of the sec-
ondary circuit in order to address the above-mentioned
questions.
II. SIMULATION MODELS AND VALIDATION
II.A. Dynamic Simulator for Nuclear Power Plants System
Dynamic simulator for nuclear power plants10
~DSNP! is a block-oriented simulation language by which
a large variety of nuclear power plants can be simulated.
In the past the DSNP was successfully applied to LMFBR
and pressurized water reactor accident analyses.11,12 It
was also used in the simulations of pebble-bed HTGRs
including the full-scale simulations of the PNP-500 plant13
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and the THTR-300 power plant. For this reason, many
new component models, e.g. the pebble-bed core, the
blower, and the steam generator, were developed and
extensively validated.
In the previous DSNP library there were two types of
cavity models, namely a gas cavity model and a two-
phase water steam cavity model. However, the water in-
gress from the high-pressure secondary circuit into the
primary circuit is a complex process, which involves
liquid water, steam, and helium multiphase flow for mass
and heat transfer phenomena. There is mass transport
between the liquid water and steam due to water vapor-
ization and steam condensation. Therefore, a multiphase
cavity model was developed in the DSNP system in order
to have the capability to analyze the water transport in
the primary circuit.
II.B. Multiphase Cavity Model
The basic assumptions include homogeneous mix-
ture and thermal equilibrium. The sedimentation of water
droplets in the cavity is not considered. For brevity, the
water in liquid state was designated as “water,” water in
gaseous state as “steam” and the mixture of both as “H2O.”
Figure 1 gives the structure of multiphase cavity
model. Three parameters were chosen to describe the
water, steam, and helium multiphase cavity model as
follows:
The helium mass fraction
y 5
Mh
M
, ~1!
specific volume
v 5
V
M
, ~2!
and specific internal energy
u 5
U
M
, ~3!
where M, U, and V denote the total mass, the total inter-
nal energy, and the total volume in the cavity, respec-
tively; and the subscript h denotes the fraction of helium.
The following conservation equations were used to
determine the three variables above:
The mass conservation equation
V
dS 1vD
dt 5 (i
Giin 2 (
j
Gjex , ~4!
the mass conservation equation of helium
M
dy
dt 5 (i
yiin Giin 2 y (
j
Gjex
2yS(
i
Giin 2 (
j
GjexD , ~5!
and the energy conservation equation
M
du
dt 5 Q 1 (i
hiin Giin 2 h (
j
Gjex
2uS(
i
Giin 2 (
j
GjexD 1 K~Tm 2 T ! , ~6!
where t, T, G, h, and Q denote time, temperature, mass
flow rate, specific enthalpy, and heat source term respec-
tively; K is the product of the heat transfer coefficient and
the wall surface area; the subscript m denotes the cavity
wall; and the superscripts in and ex denote the inlet and
outlet of the cavity.
Then the specific volume and the specific internal
energy of H2O can be written as
vH2O 5
v
1 2 y ~7!
and
uH2O 5
u 2 yCvT
1 2 y , ~8!
where Cv is the specific heat capacity of helium at con-
stant volume.
Using ~vH2O, uH2O! as input variables, the tempera-
ture can be determined by iterations and the other prop-
erties like steam partial pressure and steam quality,
etc., can be calculated through a water thermodynamic
calculation.
The specific volume of helium is
vh 5
v
y F1 2 ~1 2 x!vwvH2O G , ~9!
where x is steam quality and the subscript w denotes
liquid water. The helium partial pressure is
ph 5
RT
mh vh
; ~10!
Fig. 1. Structure of a multiphase cavity.
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the pressure of cavity is therefore
p 5 ph 1 pH2O , ~11!
where R is the general gas constant, and m is molar mass.
On the basis of the previous DSNP two-phase model,
the multiphase cavity model is formed by adding a dif-
ferential equation on the helium fraction y as in Eq. ~5!
and implemented in the DSNP system as a component
model.Amaterial property subroutine that determines the
thermodynamic properties of the cavity by using ~ y, v, u!
as input has been implemented as a user-supplied library,
which can also be used in other DSNP components easily.
In addition, the hydraulic network in DSNP has also been
improved to deal with the multiphase flow.
II.C. TINTE Program
With the one-dimensional DSNP simulation, it is im-
possible to obtain the fuel peak temperature during the
transient, which is an important safety parameter to as-
sess the consequences of severe water ingress accidents.
TINTE is a program with coupled two-dimensional core
neutron dynamics and thermal hydraulics in HTGRs
~Ref. 9!. The two-dimensional TINTE simulation, based
on the results given by the DSNP simulation, can give the
detailed fuel temperature profiles. With the updated sim-
ulation capability, it became feasible to analyze the con-
sequence of reactivity insertion caused by the water
ingress.
II.D. Validation of Models
The Marviken III Test14 is one in a series of tests
performed as a multinational project at the Marviken
Power Station by ABB Atom Sweden. In order to vali-
date the DSNP model, the Marviken III Test 4, which
aimed to establish the choked flow rate data for a large-
scale nozzle with subcooled and low-quality water con-
ditions at the nozzle inlet, was simulated. As shown in
Fig. 2, the pressure vessel was initially filled with water
to an elevation of 16.8 m above the discharge pipe inlet.
The steam dome above the water was saturated at 4.94
MPa. The water of ;6 m in depth below the surface was
at nearly saturation conditions. The water below the sat-
urated fluid and a small transition zone was subcooled by
;308C. An experiment was performed by opening the
discharge pipe outlet to the ambient pressure.
As shown in Fig. 3, the DSNP simulation gives a
comparable pressure history at the top of the experiment
vessel and a comparable choked flow rate. However, be-
cause of lacking a nonequilibrium model, the code was
unable to predict the pressure undershooting at the be-
ginning of the blowdown. This comparison shows that
the DSNP could give a not-exact but reasonable predic-
tion for a large-scale discharge test.
In order to validate the multiphase cavity model, a
process described as below was simulated. Subcooled
water at conditions of 19 MPa02408C enters into a cavity
of helium at conditions of 6 MPa02508C. The flow rate
of water is 0.1 kg0s. The cavity volume was estimated as
1.355 m3. The calculation gave reasonable results as shown
in Fig. 4. After entering the cavity, water became vapor-
ized due to a very low partial pressure of steam. Because
Fig. 2. Marviken III Test.
Fig. 3. Comparison of DSNP with Marviken test.
Fig. 4. Results of helium cavity with subcooled water ingress.
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the subcooled water can not compensate the energy re-
quired in the vaporization, the water has to receive the
energy from the helium. Therefore, the temperature and
then the partial pressure of helium were decreased. Dur-
ing the early phase, the water in the cavity was vaporized
completely to superheated steam. Afterwards, since the
helium was unable to compensate the vaporization en-
ergy, liquid droplets or mist were formed in the cavity.
The system pressure and temperature reached their min-
imum point and increased thereafter.
For comparing the DSNP model with the TINTE
program, the blower shutdown transient in the HTR-
module was simulated. The transient was initiated from
a normal operation. No control rods were moved during
the transient. As the blower speed was reduced, the
flow rate of the primary circuit was decreased, and the
helium temperature at the reactor core outlet was in-
creased. The increase of coolant temperature and fuel
temperature would lower the reactor nuclear power
through the negative temperature reactivity feedback.
The helium flow rates and the reactor nuclear power
during the transient from both calculations were in good
agreement. This indicates that the blower characteris-
tics and the hydraulic calculation based on DSNP are
very close to the TINTE results. In addition, both TINTE
and DSNP modeling could predict the natural circula-
tion in the primary circuit after the blower was totally
stopped. The difference between both calculations was
within 6%.
III. ASSESSMENT OF WATER INGRESS RATE
For a low water ingress rate, the slow positive reac-
tivity insertion can be rapidly compensated by the neg-
ative fuel temperature reactivity feedback. For a large
water ingress rate, the negative temperature feedback is
unable to compensate the positive reactivity quickly, and
the core peak power would increase. This would proba-
bly make the fuel peak temperature exceed the safety-
relevant limit in such cases. Therefore, it is important
and necessary to study the effect of water ingress rate on
the consequence of accidents.
III.A. General Characteristics of Water Ingress Accidents
Figure 5 gives an overview of the HTR-module.15 A
break in the steam generator initiates the water ingress
accident. Before the H2O reaches the reactor core, it trav-
els through the blower, the upper space of the steam
generator, the connecting vessel, the reactor bottom space,
and the coolant holes in the side reflector as shown in
Fig. 5. Such a long mass transport path will delay the
H2O ingress into the reactor core.
The centrifugal separation of the water droplets in
the blower is a dominant effect for the water transport in
the blower, which has a major impact on the behavior of
water transport to the reactor core. Steam is impossible
to separate from the mixture; therefore, the influence of
blower separation will depend on the amount of the water
droplets that flow through the blower.
The break positions in the steam generator will greatly
influence the H2O transport process in the primary cir-
cuit. According to the thermodynamic properties of the
steam generator in the HTR-module shown in Table I, it
is conceivable that a break in the subcooled section of the
steam generator will lead to the flashing of water in the
primary circuit by receiving energy from the helium and
the wall. Due to the delay of heat release from the wall,
the instantaneous effect of the subcooled water ingress
could cause a temperature reduction near the break, and
therefore possibly a pressure reduction in the primary
circuit. The continuous water ingress will cause the H2O
in the primary circuit to reach a saturated state as the
partial pressure increases and temperature decreases. The
temperature in the primary circuit will then no longer
decrease. Small water droplets in mist form will appear
due to the condensation of the steam. The large amounts
of stored heat in the wall could afterwards cause the
temperature to increase and cause the water droplets to
evaporate.
If the break occurs in the superheated section of the
steam generator, it will give a quite different scenario.
The superheated steam will cause the temperature and
pressure in the primary circuit to increase and remain in
the steam state during transport to the reactor core. Only
under a very extreme condition, i.e., when the H2O par-
tial pressure reaches 4 MPa, will the steam at 2508C
become saturated. Thus, the appearance of water droplets
is very unlikely.
TABLE I
Brief Parameters and Design Data of the Steam Generator
Primary Secondary
Parameter
Thermal power ~MW! 202 202
Flow rate ~kg0s! 85 77
Inlet temperature ~8C! 700 170
Outlet temperature ~8C! 250 530
Inlet pressure ~MPa! 6 21
Pressure drop ~MPa! 0.04 2
Design data
Heat transfer area ~m2! 2100
Number of heat transfer tubes 220
Dimension of heat transfer
tube ~mm! 23 3 4.2023 3 2.5
Dimension of compensate
tube ~mm! 21.1 3 3.3
Height of heat transfer
tube ~mm! 8200
Material of heat transfer tube Incoloy 800
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The spectrum of the steam generator break sizes could
range from a small crack in a heat transfer tube to double-
end breaks of one tube, several tubes, or even all 220
tubes. The extreme condition is a double-end break of the
f550 mm plenum at the inlet and outlet of the steam
generator. A spectrum of breaks were considered in order
to find the most limiting case for the severe water ingress
accidents.
III.B. Accidental Water Transport in the Primary Circuit
The flow chart of the DSNP modeling of the HTR-
module primary circuit can be found in Fig. 6. The fuel
thermal response is simulated by a lumped wall energy
conservation equation. The reactor power is considered
as a heat source to the wall. The wall heat storage is
therefore considered, and the heat removal to the second-
ary circuit is referred to as a heat sink for the wall of the
steam generator. The total gas volume in the primary
circuit is 237 m3. The nonflow gas volume of ;120 m3
at the reactor top and at the gap between core vessel and
the reactor pressure vessel is excluded in the current mod-
eling because it would not affect the accidental water
transport in the primary circuit. In addition, the nuclear
feedback is not included. The reactor power was kept at
200 MW, and the heat was removed from the steam gen-
erator at the same value. This was to isolate the study on
the pure thermal-hydraulic phenomena of the accidental
water transport, which would not affect the analysis re-
sults of water ingress rate.
Subcooled water was assumed and was injected at
the bottom of the steam generator with a constant flow
rate of 100 kg0s. After 2000 kg of water was injected, the
water flow rate was taken as zero. As shown in Fig. 7,
the H2O concentration, i.e. the mass fraction of H2O in
the H2O0helium mixture, rises quite quickly in the steam
generator from 0 to 0.55 in 2 s. However, the H2O con-
centration in the reactor core increases rather slowly be-
cause of the long transport path. The reactor core became
affected by the appearance of H2O in ;3 s. The delay
time, which depends on the blower speed and water in-
gress flow rate, is just the time necessary for H2O to
Fig. 5. Overview of HTR-module primary circuit.
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travel from the steam generator to the core inlet. The rate
of H2O concentration increase in the reactor core, from 0
to 0.55 in 20 s, is about 10 times smaller than that in the
steam generator. This phenomenon is important to the
assessment of safety features because a lower increasing
rate of the H2O concentration will reduce the reactor
power peak.
III.C. Rate Limit of Water Ingress
In order to find the limit on the rate of water ingress
progressing into the reactor core, different water ingress
flow rates of 10, 100, 1000, and 10 000 kg0s were pro-
posed, even though not every proposed value was prac-
tical. The total water ingress mass in these cases was
assumed the same to all cases, namely 2000 kg. As shown Fig. 7. Water concentration in different components.
Fig. 6. DSNP modeling of the HTR-module power plant.
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in Fig. 8, the H2O density increasing rate for the case of
100 kg0s is 5.8 kg0m3 in 30 s. The values for the cases of
1000 and 10 000 kg0s are nearly the same, namely 5.8
kg0m3 in ;20 s. It means that the H2O density increase
rate reaches a limit, i.e., 0.3 kg0~m3s!. This was due to
two mechanisms: ~1! the transport of H2O is limited by
the system geometry, and ~2! the pressure decrease at the
beginning due to the water vaporization behaves like a
spring, which reduces the H2O impulse in the reactor
core.
The heat release from the wall plays an important
role on the accidental water transport in primary circuit.
In order to examine the influence of wall mass, cases of
the wall mass of 50% to 150% of the original one were
considered. The calculated results of these cases show
that, for different wall masses, there are no major changes
in the rate of water ingress progressing into the reactor
core. However, the small wall mass seems to be unable to
evaporate all water droplets, and it is possible that the
water droplets would enter the reactor core at a later time.
In order to determine the blower separation effect
liveness, the separation efficiency was defined as the
ratio of the water mass separated over the total water
mass passing the blower. The separation efficiency de-
pends on the diameter of the water droplets, the blower
speed, and the geometry of the blower. To obtain the
efficiency, it was necessary to perform sensitivity studies
on the blower. The separation efficiencies 0%, 25%, 50%,
and 100% were assumed. Figure 9 shows that the 100%
separation of water droplets in the blower reduces the
H2O density in the reactor core to half of the value of the
no-separation case. The increasing rate of the H2O den-
sity is also lowered. Therefore, the blower separation
effect is a positive factor for mitigating the consequences
of severe water ingress accidents.
The previous analyses were based on a break in the
subcooled section of the steam generator. A break in the
superheated section of the steam generator has a higher
probability for its occurrence during the operation of the
HTR-module power plant because of the higher operat-
ing temperature. The steam was assumed to be injected
from the superheated section of the steam generator to
the primary circuit with a flow rate of 10 kg0s. The total
steam ingress mass was 2000 kg. The steam flow rate of
10 kg0s was equal to double-end breaks of about 11
heating tubes of the steam generator, which was very
unlikely from the engineering viewpoint. Because there
was no condensation or vaporization of H2O in the steam
ingress process, the temperatures in the primary circuit
did not change very quickly. However, the system pres-
sure increased quickly. At 100 s, the pressure approaches
9 MPa, which was far higher than the opening pressure of
the safety relief valves. In the analyses presented in this
section, the valves were assumed closed. It seems that a
break in the superheated section is not so much more
detrimental than that in the subcooled section. The cur-
rent paper therefore focuses on the break in the sub-
cooled section.
From all analyses presented above, the maximum
rate of H2O ingress into the reactor core was determined
to be 0.3 kg0~m3s!.
III.D. Maximum Peak Fuel Temperature
To find the maximum peak fuel temperature, the
TINTE program was used to perform a two-dimensional
calculation. The simulation was performed by artifi-
cially injecting the steam from the annular channel of the
coaxial tube. The system pressure was kept at 6 MPa, the
rated value.
Figure 10 gives the core maximum temperature ver-
sus the helium flow rate and the water flow rate. The
most limiting situation is the 200 kg0s steam ingress flow
Fig. 8. Average water density in core for different water in-
gress flow rates.
Fig. 9. Average water density in core for different separation
efficiencies.
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rate with 0 kg0s helium flow rate. As the steam flows into
the reactor core, the positive reactivity insertion quickly
caused the reactor power to increase, which reaches the
peak value of 28 times of the rated value rapidly. There-
after, the power is reduced by the negative temperature
reactivity feedback. The sharp power increase heats the
core quickly. In a short time of 7 to 8 s, the core peak
temperature increases from 823 to 14588C before it de-
creases due to the power decreasing. At ;15 s, the steam
replaces all the helium in the core. After that, because of
the pressure in the reactor, the water inventory in the
reactor maintains approximately constant. No further pos-
itive reactivity is inserted. The core maximum tempera-
ture is lower than the safety-relevant temperature limit of
16008C.
The 200 kg0s steam input is equal to a H2O density-
increasing rate of 5 kg0~m3s!. It is approximately 16
times of the limiting value estimated by the above analy-
ses, namely 0.3 kg0~m3s!. The analyses in this section
seem to indicate that no significant core damage would
occur during the primary water ingress power impulse
under any circumstances.
IV. ASSESSMENT OF WATER INGRESS MASS
In the secondary circuit of the HTR-module ~see
Fig. 6!, the deaerator contains ;200 000 kg of water. If
such a huge amount of water was pumped into the pri-
mary circuit continuously for a long time, the reactor
core could be filled with water. This would cause severe
chemical reactions between the water and reactor graph-
ite fuel elements. In the HTR-module design, there are
many operating options to limit the amount of water mov-
ing into the primary circuit during a water ingress acci-
dent. However, if the safety protection system fails, is it
possible that nearly all water in the deaerator is pumped
to the steam generator and then to the primary circuit? In
this section, this question is addressed by analyzing the
behavior of the secondary circuit during the severe water
ingress accidents and by performing the full-scale sim-
ulation of severe water ingress accidents.
IV.A. Phenomena of Cavitation in the Feedwater Pumps
Pumps are normally designed to function with liquid
as the working fluids. To make a pump work properly, the
working fluids in the pump should be kept in subcooled
states to avoid bubbles appearing on the blade surface.
This is because bubbles would form cavities on the blade
surface, and if the bubbles last for a long time during
operation, the pump would fail. This is called cavitation.
An extreme situation is that the main flow stream is sat-
urated, what is referred to as full cavitation. In this case,
the pump head will quickly decrease following a strong
vibration.
For the HTR-module, the secondary circuit is so de-
signed that during normal and transient operations no
cavitation is possible in the feedwater pump. However,
during the severe water ingress accidents, the pump may
behave differently. A break in the steam generator will
depressurize the secondary side of the steam generator.
Consequently, the pump head is lowered. According to
the general characteristics of pumps, as the pump head
decreases the flow rate in the pump will increase. The
flow rate increase will reduce the system available net
positive suction head ~NPSH! and raise the system re-
quired NPSH. If the former is less than the latter, the
pump cavitates and the pumping rate is reduced. Thus, it
is possible a full cavitation could occur if there is enough
depressurization.
For a typical condensate pump in a power plant, the
full cavitation starts after the system flow rate exceeds
115%. However, the corresponding data for the HTR-
module is unavailable because no HTR-module has ever
been built. In the current study, it was conservatively
assumed that the pump will be in full cavitation if the
pump flow rate exceeds the rated value by 30%.
IV.B. Behavior of the Secondary Circuit
During Water Ingress Accidents
The DSNP model of the secondary circuit can be
found in Fig. 6. The pump characteristics are assumed
to be
H 5 3614 2 1319~G077!1.8 , ~12!
where H is the pump head ~m! and G is the pump flow
rate ~kg0s!. It is close to the characteristic of the feed-
water pump in the THTR-300.
The water discharge flow rates at the steam genera-
tor bottom were assumed as 10, 50, and 100 kg0s. The
calculation was performed with the assumption that there
was no safety protection. The results are shown in Fig. 11.
The 10 kg0s discharge flow rate does not lead the pump
to a full cavitation state. The system pressure of the
Fig. 10. Fuel element maximum temperatures for the different
water ingress conditions.
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secondary circuit is stabilized at 19.5 MPa. The dis-
charge flow rates of 50 and 100 kg0s lead the pump to a
full cavitation state. The pressure of the secondary circuit
drops sharply to the equilibrium pressure of the primary
circuit.
The results demonstrate that during a severe water
ingress accident, the cavitation will quickly stop the feed-
water pump and limit the water ingress to the primary
circuit. This is an inherent safety feature. It seems that a
continuous large flow rate of the water ingress from the
steam generator is impossible. However, the results also
indicate that the cavitation will come into effect only for
a large break, such as multitube breaks. A small break
may not be enough to lead to a full cavitation state. In this
case the secondary circuit will regulate itself to a new
steady state and the water will be continuously pumped
to the primary circuit. Thus, the long term water ingress
into the reactor primary circuit will be limited to a value
between 10 and 50 kg0s.
IV.C. Full-Scale Simulation of Severe Water
Ingress Accidents
The model of full-scale simulation of the HTR-
module power plant is illustrated in Fig. 6. The pressures
of both circuits are important for the full-scale simula-
tion, thus the nonflow volume that simulates the space
between the core vessel and the reactor pressure vessel
has been considered important as it improves the mod-
eling of the pressure transient. The water ingress reac-
tivity insertion, as a function of core average H2O density,
has been included in the nuclear feedback model.
There are two safety relief valves in the primary
circuit. The first opens when the pressure exceeds 6.9
MPa with a cross section area of 0.5 cm2. The second
opens when the pressure exceeds 7.3 MPa with a cross
section area of 33 cm2. The safety relief valves are as-
sumed to fail to close during the accidents.
Figure 12 summarizes the time-dependent pressures
of the primary and secondary circuits for the water in-
gress accidents with one-tube double-end breaks. For the
break in the subcooled water section of the steam gener-
ator, i.e., water section break, the pressure of the primary
circuit increases gradually. At the time of 21 s, the pres-
sure of the primary circuit reaches 6.9 MPa. Soon after
that the first safety relief valve opens. The break flow
rate at this time is 56.8 kg0s. The discharge flow rate of
the safety relief valve is about 0.3 kg0s, which is not
large enough to depressurize the primary circuit. The
pressure of the primary circuit increases continuously
until ;27 s, at which time the second safety relief valve
opens. About 24 kg0s of the H2O0helium mixture is dis-
charged to the reactor cavity and causes the primary cir-
cuit to depressurize. When the secondary circuit is
depressurized to ;9 MPa, the full cavitation of the feed-
water pump occurs based on the assumption that the 130%
flow rate in the feedwater pump was the threshold point
of full cavitation. The secondary circuit is depressurized
quickly due to loss of driving force and the water ingress
stops. The maximum H2O inventory is limited within
1700 kg due to the full cavitation of the feedwater pump,
as shown in Fig. 13.
For the one-tube break in the superheated steam sec-
tion of the steam generator, i.e., steam section break, the
mass inventory curve is smoother than that of a water
section break. At the time of ;140 s, the first safety relief
valve opens and the primary circuit is depressurized. The
secondary circuit pressure at the steam generator bottom
will be stabilized at ;18 MPa. At this pressure, there will
be no cavitation in the feedwater pump. However, the
maximum H2O inventory is plateaued to a value slightly
below 1200 kg due to the opening of the safety relief
valve.
For the water section 10-tube break, due to the sharp
depressurization of the secondary circuit, the pressure
Fig. 11. System pressure of the secondary circuit with consid-
ering pump cavitation.
Fig. 12. Pressures of the primary and secondary circuits for
the one-tube double-end break water ingress accidents.
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equilibrium between the primary and secondary circuit is
reached within 10 s. Thereafter, the pressures of the pri-
mary and secondary circuits move together because no
water is pumped from the deaerator. Because a full cav-
itation of the feedwater pump is induced very quickly,
the maximum H2O inventory in the primary circuit is
limited to 1600 kg, as illustrated in Fig. 14. Passing the
peak of the curve, the H2O inventory drops down be-
cause of discharge in the safety relief valve.
For a 10-tube break in the steam section, the pressure
decrease in the secondary circuit is rather smooth, and
the full cavitation of the feedwater pump can not be in-
duced in a short time. At the time of 80 s, the H2O
inventory in the primary circuit is ;2600 kg. Because
the discharge flow rate of the safety relief valves is not
large enough, the H2O inventory will continually in-
crease until a full cavitation of the feedwater pump oc-
curs. If a larger cross section area of the safety relief
valve could be designed, the H2O inventory could be
limited to 3000 kg.
For a plenum break in the steam section, the depres-
surization of the secondary circuit at the beginning is
very fast. The feedwater pump will go full cavitation in
;15 s. For the feedwater section plenum break, due to a
sharp depressurization of the secondary circuit, the feed-
water pump could not function at all. In any case the
feedwater pump will be stopped because of a full cavi-
tation; in this case, only the 2830 kg of H2O retained in
the steam generator could flow into the primary circuit.
Therefore, the total mass of H2O ingress into the primary
circuit is no more than 2000 to 3000 kg.
IV.D. Limitation of Water Ingress Accidents
From the analyses above, it seems that the total H2O
inventory in the primary circuit can be assumed to be
limited within 2000 to 3000 kg for all possible break
sizes by the following arguments:
1. for a small-size break ~,,1-tube break!, the water
ingress flow rate is so small that there is enough time to
let the operator take correct actions and the accident can
be resolved by the operation and control of the helium
system.
2. for a middle-size break ~,1-tube break!, the de-
pressurization of the secondary circuit is not large enough
to cause the full cavitation of the feedwater pump. The
opening of the safety relief valves in the primary circuit
will limit the H2O inventory in the primary circuit.
3. for a large-size break ~; or .1-tube break!, the
depressurization of the secondary circuit is large enough
to cause the full cavitation of feedwater pump. The stop
of the feedwater pump and the discharge by the safety
relief valves limit the H2O inventory in the primary circuit.
The boundary between the mid-size break and the
large-size break is determined by the characteristics of
the feedwater pump. A break that is large enough to in-
duce the full cavitation of the feedwater pump is defined
as a large-size break. The size of the safety relief valve
should be designed in a way that its opening can limit the
H2O inventory in the primary circuit.
In this context, the reactor safety does not depend on
the proactive actuation of the safety protection system
such as the steam generator isolating and emptying. It
depends only on the inherent or passive mechanisms;
such as
1. the opening of the safety relief valve
2. the full cavitation of the feed water pump.
During water ingress accidents, in order to control
chemical reactions between H2O and fuel elements on a
long-term basis, the most effective method is to shut
down the reactor. After the reactor is shut down, the
Fig. 13. H2O inventory in the primary circuit for the one-tube
double-end break water ingress accidents.
Fig. 14. H2O inventory in the primary circuit for the 10-tube
double-end break water ingress accidents.
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temperature in the core will soon become ,5008C. At
this temperature the corrosion of the fuel elements by the
H2O is minimum. The reactor shut down by control rods
is adopted only for the purpose of minimizing the long-
term reactivity effects. There is no need for a quick ac-
tuation of a shut down reactor system.
V. CONCLUSIONS
For the HTR-module, during the severe water in-
gress accidents without any proactive actuation of safety
protection systems, the liquid water vaporization in the
steam generator and characteristics of H2O transport from
the steam generator to the reactor core reduce the rate of
water ingress into the reactor core. The maximum H2O
concentration ingress rate into the reactor core was de-
termined as 0.3 kg0~m3s!. If the secondary circuit is de-
pressurized enough due to a larger break in the steam
generator, the feedwater pump will be inherently stopped
by a full cavitation. The total H2O inventory in the pri-
mary circuit can be limited within 3000 kg for all possi-
ble break sizes. Although severe water ingress accidents
involve a significant increase of reactivity, the impact of
the fast nuclear transient on the fuel element integrity
does not lead to any safety concerns. Especially there is
no indication of release of larger amounts of radioactiv-
ity from the fuel elements under any circumstances.
The assessments made in this paper are yet to be
verified experimentally. These include the delay effects
in the primary circuit and the behavior of the feedwater
pump. Modeling of the chemical reactions is not in-
cluded in the current scope. This will be improved in the
future. The thermodynamic nonequilibrium could be a
dominant effect during fast water ingress accidents. The
detailed analysis with such, which although not expected
to alter the current conclusions, would be nevertheless
included in the future investigation.
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